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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between misunderstanding and language comprehension. A misunderstanding is 
 
This faulty interpretation can be ascribed to the inconsistencies that occur during the comprehension of a linguistic 
message and to the interference of emotions with that comprehension. This paper tries to identify these 
inconsistencies and to explain their relationship to misunderstanding. It also tries to find evidence of the interference 
of emotions with language comprehension and its contribution to misunderstanding. 
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1. Introduction 
 
     Interest in the study of misunderstanding is not recent. Many attempts have been made towards the 
analysis of misunderstanding so far. They varied in accordance with the aim of, and the approach 
followed in the analysis. However, the interest in misunderstanding culminated in 1999 in allocating a 
special issue of the Journal of Pragmatics (31, 1999) for papers addressing this phenomenon. Among the 
contributors to this special issue were Dascal (1999), Bazzanella and Damiano (1999), Weigand (1999), 
and Weizman (1999). 
 
Some of the studies of misunderstanding addressed the management of misunderstanding, i.e. how often 
misunderstanding occurs during a communicative act (Fraser, 1993) and how misunderstanding is 
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detected and repaired (Bazzanella&Damiano, 1999; Schegloff, 1992). Other studies were interested in 
what is misunderstood (Bazzanella&Damiano, 1999; Weigand, 1999).  
 
However, most of misunderstanding studies concentrated on the causes of misunderstanding. Milroy 
(1984), for instance, tackles dialectical misunderstandings, i.e. misunderstandings which arise between 
people using different dialects, aiming at highlighting the sources of misunderstanding in cross-dialectal 
communication. Examining material of miscommunication data from Hiberno-English dialect, Milroy 
inferences which 
semantic structures from which they derive that utterance" (p. 24). 
 
Dascal (1985) singles out four causes of misunderstanding, viz. faulty assignment of reference, faulty 
identification of the topic of conversation, divergence between the intended meaning of utterance and the 
one chosen by the interlocutor and stylistic variation. 
 
     Blakemore (1989) shoulders the communicator the responsibility of the occurrence of 
misunderstanding suggesting that the choice of the message on the part of the communicator has a role in 
the occurrence of misunderstanding. The more implicit the message, the more likely the misunderstanding 
is.  
 
Yus (1998, p. 82; 1999b, p. 219) ascribes all types of misunderstanding to "the combination of three 
pragmatic continua: (a) the intentional vs. unintentional continuum; (b) the verbal vs. nonverbal 
continuum; and (c) the explicit vs. implicit continuum". In the first continuum, Yus focuses on the 
communicator at the expense of the communicatee and regards a stimulus intentional only if its content is 
deliberately intended. This, of course, excludes the role of the communicatee in interpretation. The 
second continuum states truly that misunderstanding is possible in nonverbal as well as verbal 
communication. The third continuum depends on the degree of contextualization accompanying a 
stimulus. A stimulus is explicit when its interpretation is satisfied with minimal contextualization, 
whereas it is implicit when the interpretation demands extra contextualization. 
 
Bazzanella and Damiano (1999) study misunderstanding with respect to two dimensions: the level at 
which misunderstanding occurs and the factors  which they call triggers  that facilitate the occurrence 
of misunderstanding. That is, they are interested in both what is misunderstood and why it is 
misunderstood.  
 
Weizman's (1999) account of misunderstanding is based on the view that conversation is a collective 
action. The merit of this view is that misunderstandings can be sorted into two types: the "I-level" and the 
"We-level" misunderstandings. The former refer to "individual speaker's meanings and the latter to the 
collective, shared direction of an exchange" (p. 837). Applying this two-level distinction of 
misunderstanding on a Hebrew text, Weizman (1999) tries to show how miscommunication of the I-level 
is exploited to build true understanding on the We-level. 
 
Bou-Franch (2002, pp. 324-325) divides sources of misunderstanding into two categories: external 
sources and participant-related sources. Among external sources of misunderstanding she identifies 
"disturbing background noise and/or troubles related to the use of a foreign language". Regarding 
participant-related sources of misunderstanding, she singles out two subcategories: sources related to the 
speaker (henceforth speaker-related sources) and sources related to the listener (henceforth listener-
related sources). The former (speaker-related sources) have to do with ambiguity. The speaker either 
holds information necessary for the listener to interpret the message, or the speaker may think that the 
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cues he/she provides are sufficient enough for the listener to interpret the given message. The latter 
(listener-related sources) may be phonological (e.g. mishearing, intonational contours), lexical (e.g. 
misrecognizing the meanings of some words), syntactic (e.g. misparsing part of the utterance), or 
pragmatic (e.g. the context, lack of cultural background).  
 
     In this paper, misunderstanding is hypothesized to be causedby the inconsistencies which take place 
during comprehension and to the interference of emotions with comprehension. This hypothesis stems 
from the fact that language comprehension is more complex than we might think. It involves the 
paralinguistic cues, gestures, facial expressions, body movements and cues provided by the physical 
, p. 106). The multiplicity of tasks in 
the comprehension process casts heavy unconscious burden on the comprehender, which renders 
comprehension potentially risky and liable for interpretive errors. Such errors may preclude extracting the 
intended meaning behind a piece of discourse causing misunderstanding. 
 
     The researcher, therefore, traces the path of the comprehension process to identify the inconsistencies 
which may trigger misunderstanding, and to seek evidence of the interference of emotions with 
comprehension and their contribution to misunderstanding. 
 
2. What is misunderstanding? 
     p) which a 
speaker (S) expresses in an utterance (x -Jones, 1986, p. 109). 
 
     
 
 
Yus (1999a, p. 10; 1999b, p. 218) defines misunderstanding as: 
(a) the addressee's inability to select one interpretation, among all the possible 
interpretations that a stimulus can have in a context C, which is precisely the 
interpretation that the addressor intends to communicate; and (b) the 
addressee's inability to process optimally the contextual information that the 
socio-cultural environment exudes, as it were, without any prior 
intentionality in its communication. 
 
Weigand (1999) tries to define the standard case of misunderstanding. Following a model of dialogic 
action games, she proposes fiveconstitutive features of misunderstanding: 
 Misunderstanding is a form of understanding which is partially or totally deviant from what the 
speaker intended to communicate. 
 As a form of understanding, it refers to the reverse side of meaning or to the reverse side of the 
utterance, and represents a cognitive phenomenon belonging to the interlocutor. 
 The interlocutor who misunderstands is not aware of it. 
 Misunderstanding cannot be considered as a cognitive act because the hearer is not aware of it; 
instead, it represents an ability or inability of the hearer. 
 Misunderstanding will normally be corrected in the course of ongoing dialogic action game. We 
may be confident that we will arrive at an understanding in the dialogic action game as a whole 
even if an utterance has been misunderstood. Meaning and understanding or misunderstanding of 
an utterance is not an autonomous unit by itself but a part of the dialogic interaction. It is 
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because of the general Dialogic Principle that language use can tolerate cases of 
misunderstanding (pp. 769-770). 
 
     
interpretation for some turn which is complete and coherent from his point of view, but is not the one 
 (p. 1). Here, there is an implicit shift of misunderstanding from semantics to 
pragmatics. Firstly, a role is given to inference in choosing the message interpretation. Secondly, 
 
 
     
interpretation for an utterance which is not the one intended by the communicator. 
 
3. Some characteristics of the linguistic input 
     Connected speech is strikingly characterized by the high speed with which it arrives to the listener. 
Studies have shown a speech rate average between 140-180 words per minute in everyday conversation 
(Wingfield, 1993). Moreover, analyses of the acoustic material of ordinary speech have found that the 
linguistic elements of speech (words, phrases, clauses,) are so tightly woven that no clear regular breaks 
between them are detectable. 
constituents of the incoming speech waves depending on the whole meaning of the sentence. Again, not 
all the linguistic elements of the incoming speech are articulated as clearly as required. Some elements 
lack the necessary clarity for their correct identification (ibid.). 
 
     
8) and the immediacy of processing (Lewis, 
1993, p. 13)  render it unwarranted for all the sentences to have been processed before the listener 
to be disorderly, the idea which is communicated by the sentence will be deficient, deformed, or 
-Jawadi, 2002, p.  32). 
 
4. Immediacy of processing 
     Immediacy of processing refers to the speed at which the speech stimulus can be processed. The 
wealth of data available has shown that the computation of all levels of linguistic representation is carried 
out on a word-by-word basis. That is, an incoming word is immediately integrated into a partial syntactic 
structure, a partial semantic representation and a referential representation (Lewis, 1993). The bulk of 
evidence for language processing immediacy comes from speech shadowing experiments (Marslen-
Wilson, 1973), eye movement studies (Carpenter &Daneman, 1981) and cross-modal experiments (Tyler 
&Marslen-Wilson, 1982).  
 
-
Jawadi, 2002, p. 32). Improper and/or incomplete processing owing to immediacy of processing often 
 
 
5. Syntactic processing  
     The listener produces syntactic representation to make the syntactic discriminations which are 
necessary to arrive at the correct meaning (Lewis, 1993). In order to construct a syntactic representation, 
the listener has "to break up incoming sentences into their constituent clauses" (Wingfield, 1993, p. 209). 
This, in turn, involves identifying boundaries of sentence constituents; this identification relies heavily on 
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the processing of the prosodic features that accompany sentences (ibid. 215). However, it is not always 
the case that successful identification of linguistic structure boundaries is achieved. Under certain 
conditions, listeners misidentify these boundaries, and as a result misunderstand the meaning underlying 
the linguistic structure. Consider the following example adapted by Weigand (1999, p. 775): 
 
1.  (A is a student; B is a professor).  
      A: I have to indicate two topics for exam. 
      B: Which ones did you choose? 
      A: Dialogue grammar and communication disturbances. 
      A: You should see me once again and tell me about your preparation.   Did you attend the 
lecture on communication disturbances? 
      A: Yes, naturally. 
      B: O.K. And what is your second topic? 
      A: Communication disturbances. 
      B: Oh, now I understand. These are two topics. I thought it was one but the relation between 
dialogue grammar and communication failures sounded strange to me and therefore I 
asked you to show me your work for the exam. 
 
The misunderstanding in this exchange is a result of improper syntactic processing owing to failure in 
prosodic processing. That is, B failed to correctly locate boundaries of the incoming structures, 
constructed a syntactic representation which was inconsistent with the actual structure .The structure 
"dialogue grammar and communication disturbances" was processed disorderly as one complex phrase 
rather than two coordinated phrases. 
 
     Related to syntactic processing is syntactic ambiguity. There are two types of syntactic ambiguity; 
local ambiguity which refers to cases where substructure of a sentence is not clear unless the whole 
structure of the sentence is complete; and standing ambiguity which refers to "cases of sentences that 
remain syntactically ambiguous even when all of the lexical information has been received" 
(Wingfield,1993, p. 226). Following Baech (1991), Wingfield stressed the role of prosodic features in 
resolving such ambiguities. Unfortunately, the prosodic features which accompany sentences are not 
always clear. 
 
     Under such circumstance, syntactically ambiguous sentences will make processing difficult. Evidence 
in support of such difficulty comes from Tabor et al. (2004) who carried out three experiments to examine 
the effects of local syntactic coherence on language processing. They found that the participants 
experienced difficulties in processing sentences with local syntactic coherence. They explained this 
finding saying that "local syntactic coherence in the input can result in the construction of syntactic 
analyses which are inconsistent with the global syntactic context" (p. 356). That is, they are likely to 
trigger misunderstanding. 
 
6. Semantic processing  
     The listener must also build "a reference independent semantic representation that corresponds to 
sense" (Lewis, 1993,  p. 11). Such a representation is necessary for comprehension for two reasons: 
1- Uncovering the semantics of a sentence is a necessary step to producing the referential 
representation. 
2- The sense of an expression is sometimes independently needed in order to understand the 
expression. (ibid.). 
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     Building a semantic representation requires the listener's access to the mental lexicon "the storehouse 
of our words and what we know about them, both on the semantic and syntactic level" (Wingfield, 1993, 
p. 211). That is, developing a proposition of an utterance involves activation of the senses of the lexical 
items that utterance consists of. Owing to memory limitations and psychological distracters sometimes 
contextually inappropriate sense of a lexical item is activated, which affects the overall interpretation 
assigned to the utterance. Add to this the risk of ambiguous lexical items which may activate more than 
one sense. Although contextual information is critical on deciding which sense to choose, on some 
occasions the wrong sense is selected, thus a faulty interpretation is developed.  
 
7. Inferential processing  
     Syntactic processing and semantic processing are primarily linguistic, i.e. only knowledge about the 
language is accessed. However, comprehension involves accessing knowledge about the world. The 
necessity of inferential processing is demonstrated in numerous studies (Bransford& Johnson, 1973; 
Chiesi et al., 1979; Dooling&Lachman, 1971; Spilich et al., 1979). Bransford& Johnson (1973), for 
instance, asked readers to comprehend and recall paragraphs that contained a number of vague referring 
expressions. These paragraphs elicited low comprehension ratings and poor recall. Comprehension ratings 
and recall improved significantly when readers were provided with a title that evoked relevant world 
knowledge.  
 
     One of the functions of inferential processing is the building of a referential representation which 
relates lexical items to their referents. The nature of this representation is specified by Lewis (1993) in 
stating that "comprehension builds a referential representation which contains information about the 
particular referents of the discourse in the particular situation described by the discourse " (p. 9). 
 
     According to Bransford et al. (1972), comprehension constructs a representation of the described 
situation that integrates the information explicit in the input along with inferred or background 
information. The result is a single coherent representation of the context.  
 
     Reference assignment is sometimes problematic, especially when the referent is not clear and needs to 
(1813: Ch. XIII, P. 54) dialogue between Mr. and Mrs.Bennet:  
 
2.Mr.Bennet: I hope, my dear, that you have ordered a good dinner today, because I have reason to 
expect an addition to our family party. 
Mrs.Bennet: Who do you mean, my dear? I know nobody that is coming, I am sure, unless Charlotte 
Lucas should happen to call in, and I hope my dinners are good enough for her. I 
do not believe she often sees such at home.  
Mr.Bennet: The person of whom I speak is a gentleman and a stranger.  
Mrs.Bennet: A gentleman and a stranger! It is Mr. Bingley, I am sure.  
Mr.Bennet: It is not Mr.Bingley; it is a person whom I never saw in the whole course of my life. 
 
Mr.Bennet's description of the person whom he was talking about as a gentleman and a stranger made its 
referent unclear, for so many persons are gentlemen and strangers. The unclarity of the referent tempted 
Mrs.Bennet to wrongly activate the most relevant one from her point of view, Mr. Bingley who was also a 
gentleman and a stranger; thus the dialogue ended up in a misunderstanding. 
 
     Simila
utterance in the following exchange:  
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3.     Beatrice: My God. So how long you want to stay? 
Marco:   With your permission, we will stay maybe a ----- . 
Eddie:   
Marco:  Oh. Maybe four, five, six years, I think. 
                                                                                                (Miller, 1955, Act I: 29) 
 
asking about. He activated a referent demanding minimum contextualization. 
     Therefore, comprehending discourse requires more than simply accumulating the meanings of the 
(Wright &Newhoff, 2004, p. 450). 
 
     Inferential processing relies on our previous knowledge which consists, according to Schank& 
Abelson (1977), of two classes: general knowledge 
and specific knowledge we employ "to interpret and participate in events we have been through many 
times. Specific detailed knowledge about a situation allows us to do less processing and wondering about 
frequently experienced events" (ibid.). 
 
Escandell-Vidal (1996) argued for cultural variation in specific knowledge. The reason behind this 
 
 
     n evidence of an individual 
variation assumption is not unattainable. First, the assumption is evident by the specificity of knowledge. 
Being specific, specific knowledge must vary across individuals. Second, our experience of the situations 
and events that specific knowledge represents is highly influenced by such variables as age, sex, and 
education. Thus, we conceive of situations and events differently from perspectives that coincide with our 
interests and preferences. If we select a random group of people and ask them to view a mosque, for 
instance, the expected result is a variety of descriptions corresponding to the different frames they have 
marriage, we also 
expect differences in their conceptualization. Even within the same sex group, framing variation is likely 
to be found. 
 
     Further argument for inferential individual variation comes from Long et al. (1994) who examined the 
performance of skilled and less skilled readers on comprehension tasks which require inferential 
readers either a. to generate a topic-related inference on-line during comprehension b. to generate a topic-
 
 
     Experiments done by Garnham et al. (1982), Oakhill (1983, 1984) replicate this finding. These 
researchers carried out their experiments on subjects who were matched on tests of word recognition 
accuracy and reading vocabulary but differed on a test of reading comprehension. They found that less 
skilled readers relative to skilled readers (a.) benefited less from referential continuity in stories (Garnham 
et al., 1982, p. 40), (b.) made less use of context in the interpretation of a text (Oakhill, 1983, p. 447), and 
(c.) did more poorly on questions that required an inference even when the text was available during 
questioning (Oakhill, 1984, p. 37).  
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     Since the decisive step in determining the intended meaning of a discourse is inferential, individual 
differences in executing this step are likely to develop different intended meanings of the same discourse, 
which increases the likelihood of misunderstanding. Additionally, there is the process of inference 
revision. The listener must revise a previously assigned interpretation of a discourse as further context is 
available (Wright &Newhoff, 2004) in order to comprehend the discourse successfully. Failure to 
adequately comprehend the further coming context or the unavailability of such context yields that either 
the inference revision is not successful or it is not done at all. In either case, a misunderstanding is likely 
to arise.  
 
 
8. Comprehension and emotions 
     Language processing is not a purely cognitive process. Cognitive processes underlying language 
processing are always interfered with and filtered by emotions. 
 
Imaizumi and colleagues (2004) found significant interaction between emotions and language.Theyargue 
that emotion "modulates linguistic processes not only in speech production but also in speech perception, 
difference 
-of-
d the theory of male  mind 
 
 
Nabi (2003) studied emotions as frames and their influence on information accessibility, information 
seeking and subsequent judgements. Framing is defined by Entman (1993) as the selection of "some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation" (p. 52); therefore, the perception and appraisal of objects and events in the environment 
is highly influenced by the frames we have constructed of those objects and events, i.e. according to their 
relevance to "personal well-being" (p. 226). 
 
    Associating certain emotions with particular ideas or events eventually shapes the way in which one 
interprets and responds to those events that in turn affect one's worldview. Once an emotion is evoked, its 
associated action tendency serves to guide information processing influencing what information is 
attended to and likely to be recalled and what is ignored, and motivates selective processing of 
information relevant to that emotion. This selectivity affects not only the nature of information processing 
but also the influence of emotion-relevant information on judgments (p. 227). 
 
     The following example shows the interference of emotions with language processing: 
 
4.  Irene and David are looking over their menus in a restaurant. David says he will order a steak. Irene 
says, "Did you notice they also have salmon?" This question exasperates David; he protests, 
"Will you please stop criticizing what I eat?" Irene feels unfairly accused: "I didn't criticize. I 
just pointed out something on the menu I thought you might like." 
 (Tannen, 2001, p. 15) 
 
The misunderstanding here is caused by a faulty interpretation on the part of David. David and Irene go to 
have a meal in a restaurant. Looking over their menus, David decides to order a steak. Irene thinks that 
David has not noticed salmon on his menu, so she wants to tell him that there is salmon on the menu, if he 
is interested. She structures her notification in an indirect s
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the menu he may like to order but he has not noticed, as her next turn explains, it is misunderstood by 
David as a criticism of what he eats. She thinks that she does David a favour by drawing his attention to 
something he might like to order, but David reacts by accusing her of criticizing him. David chooses this 
criticized him on many occasions; therefore, he expects her present utterance to be criticism, too, even 
though it is not intended to be so. 
 
     From consideration of the above data, we conclude that cognition and emotion collaborate to process 
language. 
 
9. Conclusion 
     The data presented in this paper seem to be sufficient to conclude that there is a close relationship 
between language comprehension and misunderstanding. Language comprehension is not a 
straightforward process. It has inconsistencies at all levels of processing. These inconsistencies work to 
hinder the accurate processing of the linguistic input necessary for extracting its intended meaning 
thereby maximizing the likelihood of misunderstanding.  
 
     Besides, language comprehension is not purely cognitive. Studies have shown interference of emotions 
with comprehension. This interference filters our interpretations of the linguistic input. Thus, we make 
interpretations which bias to our emotions, diverging from the actual meaning of the linguistic input. This 
also maximizes the likelihood of misunderstanding.   
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